ATP-3.3.6-2016
NATO FORCE PROTECTION DOCTRINE FOR AIR OPERATIONS (ED A@ Ver 1)

Standard No.
ATP-3.3.6-2016
Release Date
2016
Published By
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Scope
PREFACE 1. This Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.3.6@ NATO Force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations@ provides the doctrinal framework for the comprehensive@ effective and resource efficient protection of personnel@ assets@ and capabilities engaged in the delivery of Air and Space Power effect in NATO-led operations. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces routinely operate as expeditionary forces engaged in Allied Joint operations that occur both within and outside of the territory of NATO Member States. The operational environment may have no discernible ??front lines?? or ??rear areas?? and any adversary may be expected to target Alliance assets wherever they are located using a wide range of capabilities@ conventional@ unconventional and/or asymmetric. An adversary will seek to target Allied vulnerabilities but also@ strategic assets (to include low volume/high-value Air and Space platforms) particularly those that are perceived as providing the Alliance with a battle-winning advantage. Security@ one of the principles of operations@ and protection@ a key component of security@ assumes an even higher importance in such an environment. 3. It is specifically worthy of note that with the NATO??s reliance on secure access to Space and the increasing use of Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS)@ groundstations from where these systems are operated could well be identified as legitimate targets by an adversary and therefore@ these locations@ often outside of the operational theatre@ will be at risk and will require special@ discreet consideration. Further@ Air assets do not reside solely within the Air Component so this doctrine may be viewed as having pan-component applicability 4. The purpose of this publication is to describe the fundamental aspects of Force Protection (FP) for Air Operations and provide guidance on the planning and delivery of FP. It is applicable at the Joint operational@ component and installation commander levels and is wherever possible@ coherent with Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.14 (A)@ Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection. This ATP is designed not to contradict but to develop upon the concepts expressed within the AJP in order to highlight those aspects of FP that are critical to enabling Air Operations. Whilst this publication is primarily designed for the FP of Air Operations@ the principles and processes described in this publication could equally be applied for the protection of any high-value asset be they fixed infrastructure such as an airfield@ seaport or headquarters location or@ a deployable camp or temporary logistics facility. 5. FP is complex and starts with situational awareness that must lead to situational understanding; effective and resource efficient FP can only be delivered through an absolute understanding of the threat being faced. FP for Air Operations starts with the preparation to deploy and continues through deployment@ employment and redeployment. FP covers not only military personnel of the Joint force; it is likely to include non-military personnel@ contractors@ civilians@ or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and their facilities. 6. The importance of FP for NATO-led forces is reflected in Military Committee (MC) 400/3@ Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy@ as a main capability area. FP is@ therefore@ a responsibility and basic duty of all NATO personnel. Commanders are responsible for all aspects of FP for their assigned forces. Troop contributing nations are responsible for providing their own FP@ as well as for contributing to and integrating into the wider FP plans of the Allied joint force to which they are assigned. NATO Host Nations (HNs) in concert with Allied commanders and contributing nations are responsible for providing FP support for NATO-led forces deployed within their territorial boundaries. Non-NATO HNs and local authorities in the area of operation may or may not be able@ or indeed willing@ to provide FP assistance to Allied forces. 7. This publication addresses a broad and diverse range of measures and capabilities. In a high@ multi-dimensional threat environment most if not all of these capabilities would be required to be delivered in a co-ordinated and fully integrated manner in order to enable Air Operations. FP for Air Operations needs to balance the conflicting priorities of the need to preserve capability whilst maximising freedom of action. A proactive approach to FP will often involve Joint action delivered through the co-ordination and synchronisation of manoeuvre@ joint fires@ information and outreach activities. This means that the boundaries between FP and joint action will often overlap since deliberate action to eliminate a potential threat becomes integral to FP. Fundamentally@ FP activity should enable freedom of action in spite of the presence of threats and hazards in the area of operations. It is this dynamic and co-dependent relationship that requires FP to be considered at the outset of the planning process. Further@ FP efforts in support of Air Operations must be completely in accordance with the objectives of the broader mission and be fully compliant with all extant mission directives. 8. This ATP provides the basis for the development of FP plans in support of Air Operations and for the effective and resource efficient implementation of those FP plans through directives@ location specific instructions and Tactics@ Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). This doctrine forms the cornerstone of FP for Air Operations that is essential to the protection of personnel@ facilities@ materiel@ equipment@ operations@ activities and information@ wherever NATO-led air forces may be employed. 9. Every mission will have its own specific spectrum of threats and hazards but it is unlikely that all of these will be present in all parts of the theatre of operations. Therefore@ local threat levels will need to be established in order to focus FP efforts and ensure the optimum deployment of scarce resources. Commanders should assess the criticality to the mission of the assets@ facilities and personnel in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) as well as understanding their vulnerability to all prevailing threats and hazards. An appreciation of how an adversary perceives any particular Air or Space asset will be crucial in the decision making process. FP should be based on dynamic and effective risk management. It is unrealistic to try and avoid all potential risks and hazards and to attempt to do so would likely adversely impact on the accomplishment of the mission and@ if casualties and/or capability losses were to occur@ could undermine political and military resolve. Commanders at all levels will need to balance the need for FP against the mission imperatives. 10. FP for Air Operations should be fully integrated and coordinated from the outset of the operational planning process. Appropriate pre-deployment FP training for military and deployable civilian personnel@ and when appropriate@ contractors and Locally Employed Civilians (LECs)@ is vital to the survivability of personnel and the success of the mission. Individual training remains a national responsibility@ however@ collective training of any Allied Joint force is the responsibility of the Joint Commander; any training has to be supported by a meaningful assessment process that provides a mechanism whereby forces are certified as fit for role. Although application of FP is dependent on the nature and circumstances of the threats and hazards likely to be encountered@ as well as the specific requirements of the mission@ the principles of FP should always be applied during the execution of operations. It should be highlighted that the threats and hazards present at the start of any mission are unlikely to be the ones that prevail@ therefore@ the FP posture and resources requirements should remain under continuous review. The very presence of NATO forces in a theatre of operations could well lead to a change in threat@ with the presence of NATO forces acting as a catalyst for a change in or development of a threat(s). 11. Within Allied Doctrine Architecture@ ATP-3.3.6@ NATO Force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations@ is subordinate to both AJP-3.14 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection@ and AJP-3.3@ NATO Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. In turn@ both of these AJPs are directly subordinate to AJP-3@ Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. The delivery of effective and resource efficient FP for Air Operations requires the coordination of a multitude of capabilities and disciplines@ many of these having their own@ separate doctrine publications; major references are listed at the end of this publication.



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